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INTRODUCTION 
Interlocking directorates, or management interlocks, are a 
form of structural links between companies occurring when 
firms directly or indirectly share a common board director or 
officer.1 A widespread practice in many economies around the 
world,2 interlocks, in and of themselves, are not necessarily 
harmful to competition, and indeed can produce 
procompetitive benefits.3 Nevertheless, serious risks can arise 
when interlocks involve competitors because of their potential to 
facilitate collusion or otherwise contribute to the establishment 
or maintenance of tacit or oligopolistic coordination.4 These 
competitive concerns raise particular enforcement challenges in 
small and emerging economies, which are often highly 
concentrated and tend to have weaker self-correcting tendencies 
than in larger economies.5 At the same time, scarcity of 
                                                                                                                            
1. See Org. for Econ. Coop. & Dev., Antitrust Issues Involving Minority Shareholding 
and Interlocking Directorates 23–24, DAF/COMP(2008)30 (June 23, 2009), 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/mergers/41774055.pdf [hereinafter OECD, 
Antitrust Issues]. Another common form of structural links includes minority 
shareholdings by one company in another, which often accompany interlocks. Id. 
2. Id. at 48 (“Interlocking directorates are a widespread phenomenon in many 
OECD countries and in many industry sectors.”). For further discussion regarding the 
frequency of interlocks in the United States, see Matt Krantz, Web of Board Members Ties 
Together Corporate America, USA TODAY, Nov. 24, 2002, http://
usatoday30.usatoday.com/ money/companies/management/2002-11-24-interlock
_x.htm (finding a “startling amount of overlap” among the boards of the nation’s 
leading companies). According to USA Today, at the time of the article, “one-fifth of 
the 1,000 largest companies in the USA share at least one board member with another 
of the top 1,000.” Moreover, “[e]leven of the 15 largest companies, including Pfizer 
and Citigroup, have at least two board members who sit together on another board.” 
Id. Interlocks are common elsewhere as well. See, e.g., J. Thomas Rosch, Chairman, Fed. 
Trade Comm’n, Remarks before the University of Hong Kong, Terra Incognita: 
Vertical and Conglomerate Merger and Interlocking Directorate Law Enforcement in 
the United States 15–16 (Sept. 11, 2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/
rosch/090911roschspeechunivhongkong.pdf (noting that interlocking directorates are 
a common feature of Hong Kong businesses, similar in prevalence as in the United 
States, but perhaps even more tightly linked). 
3. See Spencer Weber Waller, Corporate Governance and Competition Policy, 18 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 833, 858 (2011); see also Benjamin M. Gerber, Enabling Interlock Benefits 
While Preventing Anticompetitive Harm: Toward an Optimal Definition of Competitors Under 
Section 8 of the Clayton Act, 24 YALE J. ON REG. 107, 108 (2007) (describing interlocks as 
“a practice which may confer upon corporations benefits such as expertise, legitimacy, 
and cooptation of risk”). 
4. Waller, supra note 3, at 858. 
5. See MICHAL S. GAL, COMPETITION POLICY FOR SMALL MARKET ECONOMIES 
(2003). 
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enforcement resources makes policing these practices more 
difficult.6 
The example of Chile illustrates the challenges facing these 
jurisdictions. Management interlocks appear to be such 
common occurrences in important sectors of the Chilean 
economy, including in the health care market,7 that the 
National Economic Prosecutor’s Office (Fiscalía Nacional 
Económica or “FNE”) recently undertook a study on the issue 
and how anticompetitive interlocks might be addressed under 
the Competition Act.8 Chile—like the vast majority of 
Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development 
(“OECD”) countries—does not explicitly address the practice in 
its antitrust laws and is thus left to deal with anticompetitive 
interlocks ex ante during merger reviews,9 or ex post under its 
general competition statute.10 In one recent example, the FNE 
confronted an interlock while reviewing the acquisition of a 
department store chain by one of Chile’s largest retail 
conglomerates. The FNE ultimately decided not to initiate a 
“consultation” before the Competition Tribunal (Tribunal de 
Defensa de la Libre Competencia or “TDLC”) after the acquired 
chain agreed to eliminate ties—one of which involved common 
directors—with another retail competitor.11 While this suggests 
that Chile’s competition authorities might be able to address 
                                                                                                                            
6. See Michal S. Gal, When the Going Gets Tight: Institutional Solutions When Antitrust 
Enforcement Resources Are Scarce, 41 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 417, 433 (2010). 
7. See Pontificia Universidad Católica de Valparaíso, Mercado de la Salud Privada en 
Chile [Private Healthcare Markets in Chile] 46–48 (2012), http://www.fne.gob.cl/wp-
content/uploads/2012/11/INFORME-PUCV-MERCADO-SALUD.pdf [hereinafter 
PUCV, Private Healthcare Markets]. 
8. See Fiscalía Nacional Económica, División de Fusiones y Estudios, Participaciones 
Minoritarias y Directores Comunes entre Empresas Competidoras (Nov. 2013), http://
www.fne.gob.cl/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/Participaciones-minoritarias.pdf 
[hereinafter FNE, Minority Shareholdings]. 
9. See OECD, Antirust Issues, supra note 1, at 49 (“The majority of cases dealing 
with interlocking directorates are merger control cases, where the commonality of 
board members was considered to be a factor facilitating co-ordination between the 
interlocked firms.”); Rosch, supra note 2, at 21–22; Tommy Staahl Gabrielsen et al., 
Rethinking Minority Share Ownership and Interlocking Directorships: The Scope for Competition 
Law Intervention, 36 EUR. L. REV. 837, 855 (2011). 
10. See OECD, Antitrust Issues, supra note 1, at 46; see also Gabrielsen et al., supra 
note 9, at 859. 
11. See Operación de Concentración Cencosud–Johnson’s, FISCALIA NACIONAL 
ECONÓMICA [FNE] [NATIONAL ECONOMIC PROSECUTOR’S OFFICE] (Dec. 22, 2011), 
http://www.fne.gob.cl/2011/12/22/operacion-de-concentracion-cencosud-johnson´s. 
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potentially anticompetitive interlocks in certain instances, the 
approach is inherently limited and (as will be discussed below) 
not ideally suited to the particular constraints facing 
competition enforcement there.12  
In contrast to Chile, the antitrust laws in the United States 
provide a means of tackling anticompetitive interlocks head on. 
Section 8 of the Clayton Act prohibits a person from serving as 
either a director or a board-elected or -appointed officer of two 
or more corporations that are direct competitors with one 
another.13 Importantly, section 8 has been interpreted as 
establishing a per se prohibition, so that no anticompetitive 
effect need be shown to establish a violation.14 The purpose of 
this approach is “to nip in the bud incipient violations of the 
antitrust laws by removing the opportunity or temptation to such 
violations through interlocking directorates.”15 At the same 
time, the statute is quite limited in scope—indeed, some argue 
too limited—and provides various exceptions that assure that 
the prohibition does not affect the vast majority of competitively 
benign interlocks.16 Like any bright-line standard, “[i]t can be 
both over- and under-inclusive in particular settings.”17 
Nevertheless, as Professor Spencer Waller argues in a recent 
article on corporate governance and competition law, section 8 
represents “an appropriate compromise” that balances error 
costs and process costs.18 
While Indonesia, Japan, and Korea also address 
interlocking directorates in their competition laws, the United 
States is almost unique in adopting a per se ban that does not 
                                                                                                                            
12. In Chile, the problem of addressing potentially anticompetitive interlocks in 
the context of merger reviews is further complicated by the fact that Chile, at least 
theoretically, lacks a mandatory pre-merger notification regime. 
13. 15 U.S.C. § 19(a)(1)(B) (2012) (referring to corporations that are, “by virtue 
of their business and location of operation, competitors, so that the elimination of 
competition by agreement between them would constitute a violation of any of the 
antitrust laws”). 
14. See infra Part V.A. 
15. United States v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 111 F. Supp. 614, 616 (1953). 
16. See Rosch, supra note 2, at 20; see also OECD, Antitrust Issues, supra note 1, at 
50. 
17. Waller, supra note 3, at 858. 
18. Id. 
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require any analysis of the competitive effects of an interlock.19 
Despite that fact, and although other jurisdictions have not 
followed the US model, section 8 of the Clayton Act nevertheless 
provides an extremely useful template for countries like Chile 
(and other small, emerging economies that already have 
developed competition institutions) to begin addressing 
anticompetitive interlocks. While legal transplants from one 
jurisdiction to another “can be unsuccessful and even harmful if 
they do not deal effectively with the special characteristics of the 
following jurisdiction,”20 in this case, it is precisely because the 
harmful effects of competitor interlocks may be especially acute 
in economies characterized by tight oligopolies that the 
adoption of a limited prophylactic measure is particularly 
advisable. 
Moreover, because competition regimes in emerging 
jurisdictions may benefit from adopting simple and predictable 
standards over complex rules that seek to examine all of the 
complexities that might be associated with a particular 
practice,21 the approach of section 8 is also well-suited. 
In arguing for the advantages of the US model, this Article 
proceeds as follows: Part I begins by briefly discussing the 
potential competitive effects of management interlocks. Part II 
then looks at the special characteristics of small, emerging 
economies like Chile’s and how, informed by decision theory, 
those particularities in those jurisdictions might be taken into 
account when developing rules or standards for addressing 
interlocks. Part III then looks at how Chile’s competition 
                                                                                                                            
19. See Rosch, supra note 2, at 20–21. The competition laws in Indonesia, Japan, 
and Korea generally require that the market impact of specific interlocks be 
considered. Id. In 2011, Italy enacted the “Rescue-Italy Law Decree,” which bans 
interlocks involving members of management boards, statutory boards of auditors, or 
executive officers between companies or corporate groups in banking, insurance, or 
finance. See Valeria Falce, Interlocking Directorates: An Italian Antitrust Dilemma, 9 J. 
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 457, 461–62 (2013). 
20. Michal S. Gal, Merger Control for Small and Micro Jurisdictions, in 
KONKURRENSVERKET [SWEDISH COMPETITION AUTH.], MORE PROS AND CONS OF 
MERGER CONTROL 61, 66 (2012), available at http://www.kkv.se/upload/Filer/
Trycksaker/Rapporter/Pros&Cons/rapport_pros_and_cons_more_merger_control_
2012.pdf. 
21. See, e.g., Santiago Montt Oyarzún, Sistemas Legales de Menor Tamaño y Libre 
Competencia 7 (2010) (PowerPoint slide presentation), available at http://
www.fne.gob.cl/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/2010_ddcc_0006.pdf. 
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authorities have addressed interlocks, while Part IV, in turn, 
contrasts that with the US experience under section 8 of the 
Clayton Act, including some recent enforcement efforts. As will 
become apparent in this discussion, the US model not only 
provides an easily administrable approach for dealing with 
interlocks between competitors, it also provides the needed 
flexibility to address competitive concerns that enforcers might 
not be able to remedy effectively in the absence of the statute. 
Finally, Part V considers the relative costs and benefits of the US 
approach towards management interlocks, and whether more 
finely-tuned alternatives might be preferable, and concludes that 
the US model fulfills what a decision-theoretic framework would 
recommend as an optimal approach for an economy like 
Chile’s. 
The precise reach of any per se prohibition—whether 
implemented through a statutory amendment or by means of 
judicial rulings—would need to take into account any increased 
risks from the practice in a particular context, and some of the 
recognized weaknesses of section 8 surely could be improved 
upon. Moreover, to the extent an absolute ban does not reach 
particular instances that in fact turn out to be harmful (i.e., false 
negatives), those might still be addressed as they are currently, 
during merger review or under the general provisions of the 
competition laws. Nevertheless, the fundamental point remains: 
an absolute ban on those interlocks most likely to be 
anticompetitive (i.e., those involving direct competitors) is an 
optimal solution for small and emerging economies. 
I. THE POTENTIAL COMPETITIVE RISKS AND BENEFITS OF 
MANAGEMENT INTERLOCKS 
Minority shareholdings and interlocking directorates are 
mechanisms through which structural links may be established 
between competitors. As noted above, management interlocks 
involve situations in which one or more persons have executive 
responsibilities in two or more companies, and sometimes 
involve companies that are in horizontal or vertical business 
relationships.22 Interlocks are often accompanied by other 
                                                                                                                            
22. See PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 5 ANTITRUST LAW: AN 
ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION para. 1300, at 327 (3d ed.  
2014] COMBATING ANTICOMPETITIVE INTERLOCKS 649 
structural relationships between firms, including minority 
shareholdings, which raise their own competitive issues.23 
An interlock involving competitors may be either “direct” 
or “indirect.”24 The former is the most straightforward situation, 
and occurs when the same individual has executive 
responsibilities in two separate competing firms (as illustrated in 
FIGURE 1). 
 
FIGURE 1: Direct Interlock 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In contrast, an indirect interlock can take various forms. 
For instance, in an arrangement sometimes referred to as 
“deputization,” different individuals who represent a single 
person or corporation serve on the competitors’ boards (as 
illustrated in FIGURE 2). When the individuals, acting in a 
principal-agent relationship, for instance, represent the same 
interests on the separate boards, a situation materially the same 
as a direct horizontal interlock between the competitors can 
result. 
 
FIGURE 2: Indirect Interlock (“Deputization”) 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                            
2010) (noting that “[a]n interlocking directorate or office can take several forms” 
including horizontal and vertical forms). 
23. See FNE, Minority Shareholdings, supra note 8, at 6; see also Daniel P. O’Brien & 
Steven C. Salop, Competitive Effects of Partial Ownership: Financial Interest and Corporate 
Control, 67 ANTITRUST L. J. 569 (2000); Thomas F. Bresnahan & Steven C. Salop, 
Quantifying the Competitive Effects of Production Joint Ventures, 4 INT’L J. IND. ORG. 155 
(1986). 
24. See OECD, Antitrust Issues, supra note 1, at 48. 
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A second variation of an indirect interlock involves a person 
serving as an officer or director of two corporations that do not 
engage in competition themselves, but which have subsidiaries 
that compete with one another (as illustrated in FIGURE 3).  
 
FIGURE 3: Indirect Interlock (Parent-Subsidiary Variation 1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
And a third configuration can involve an interlock in which 
one corporation competes with the subsidiary of another (as 
illustrated in FIGURE 4). 
 
FIGURE 4: Indirect Interlock (Parent-Subsidiary Variation 2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Louis Brandeis, before his appointment to the US Supreme 
Court, was an influential voice in the early debates surrounding 
interlocking directorates, and a critic of the practice. Nearly a 
century ago, Brandeis famously wrote: 
The practice of interlocking directorates is the root of many 
evils. It offends laws human and divine. Applied to rival 
corporations, it tends to the suppression of competition and 
to violation of the Sherman law. Applied to corporations 
 Interlock
 Competition
Parent‐Subsidiary
 Interlock
 Competition
Parent‐Subsidiary
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which deal with each other, it tends to disloyalty and to 
violation of the fundamental law that no man can serve two 
masters.25 
Contrary to Brandeis’ assertion, though, the competitive 
impact of interlocks (particularly with respect to some of the 
forms described above) is not so clear cut, and a number of 
potential benefits from management interlocks have been 
identified in the economics literature. The most common 
justification relates to the ability of firms to obtain the services of 
knowledgeable and experienced directors.26 Within a particular 
industry, the number of qualified candidates may be small, and 
engaging in an interlock may be necessary to allow firms to tap 
into the limited talent pool.27 In addition, firms may use 
management interlocks to co-opt sources of supply dependency, 
thereby assuring themselves access to resources necessary for 
their business operations.28 Moreover, interlocks may lend the 
legitimacy and prestige necessary for a firm to obtain financial 
resources.29 As one commentator has suggested: 
Interlocks in some sense provide the best of both worlds 
with respect to inside and outside directors: An interlocked 
director has the ability to perform the monitoring function 
of an outside director, while—like an inside director—
providing a high level of expertise (albeit not the firm-
specific expertise that an internal manager can provide).30 
Apart from potential corporate governance benefits, 
however, direct and indirect interlocks can bring with them 
certain risks,31 especially when the interlocks involve 
                                                                                                                            
25. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY: AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 
51 (1914). 
26. See Waller, supra note 3, at 857–58; see also Gerber supra note 3, at 112–13. 
27. See Gerber, supra note 3, at 113. 
28. Id. at 114. 
29. Id. at 114–15. 
30. Id. at 115 (citations omitted). 
31. In addition to the potential competitive risks, a number of principal-agent 
issues have also been associated with management interlocks. See, e.g., Gerber, supra 
note 3, at 112 (“If managers are acting in their own self-interest rather than in the 
interest of the corporation’s shareholders, interlocks can be problematic.”); Waller, 
supra note 3, at 857–58 (noting that interlocks “can exacerbate the agency cost 
problems when a director’s decisions can benefit his interests in his other role with the 
competitor rather than serve the best interests of the shareholders at the company 
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competitors. As an initial matter, interlocks could be used to 
facilitate outright collusion.32 “[W]hen an individual 
simultaneously serves as an officer or director of two competing 
companies, he or she stumbles into a prime opportunity for 
collusion—for example, coordination of pricing, marketing, or 
production plans of the two companies.”33 This is certainly not 
to suggest that interlocks involving “competitors” invariably will 
lead to collusive behavior, and indeed there is debate in the 
economics literature as to whether such interlocks result in 
meaningfully higher levels of collusion.34 Nevertheless, collusive 
conduct is often difficult and costly to detect, and when it does 
occur, can impose significant social costs.35 Even the possibility 
that interlocks could result in collusion, therefore, should be 
taken very seriously. 
                                                                                                                            
where he serves as a director”). These risks are generally beyond the scope of this 
Article. 
32. See Christopher R. Leslie, Trust, Distrust, and Antitrust, 82 TEX. L. REV. 515, 
583–84 (2004) (discussing the historical use of interlocking directorates); see also 
Waller, supra note 3, at 858. 
33. Gale T. Miller, Interlocking Directorates and the Antitrust Laws, 26 COLO. LAW. 53, 
53 (1997). Gabrielsen et al. suggest that even information exchanges, in the context of 
management interlocks, can have beneficial effects when, for instance, more 
information regarding demand shocks permits firms to better anticipate periods of low 
and high demand. Gabrielsen et al., supra note 9, at 843. Whether this should be 
credited as a “pro-competitive” justification, however, is questionable. In any event, 
these same commentators have noted that “more detailed information in some 
instances can enable the firms to better adapt their behaviour towards one another so 
that they will end up by competing less fiercely even in a setting without collusion.” Id. 
Gabrielsen et al. conclude, based on the existing literature, that “the net effect for 
consumers and society depends on the nature of competition (Cournot versus 
Bertrand), and on the type of information that is exchanged.” Id. 
34. See Gerber, supra note 3, at 117; see also Mark S. Mizruchi, What Do Interlocks 
Do? An Analysis, Critique, and Assessment of Research on Interlocking Directorates, 22 ANN. 
REV. SOC. 271, 273 (1996); Edward J. Zajac, Interlocking Directorates as an 
Interorganizational Strategy: A Test of Critical Assumptions, 31 ACAD. MGMT. J. 428, 436 
(1988) (“Comparing the incidence of interlocks in allegedly collusive industries with 
that in a control group of firms” and concluding “that the incidence of interlocking 
among competitively interdependent firms is no greater than that predictable by 
chance.”); Donald Palmer, Broken Ties: Interlocking Directorates and Intercorporate 
Coordination, 28 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 40, 40 (1983) (discussing “the relative likelihood that 
different types of interlock ties facilitate relationships of formal coordination”). 
35. See John M. Connor & Robert H. Lande, Cartels as Rational Business Strategy: 
Crime Pays,” 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 427, 465 (2012) (adopting, as to the cost-benefit 
analysis of cartel penalties, a “relatively high 25% to 30% probability that cartels will be 
detected”—a probability Connor and Lande characterize as “conservative”). 
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Apart from outright collusion, management interlocks may 
facilitate tacit collusion or other means of oligopolistic 
coordination through anticompetitive exchanges of sensitive 
information regarding sales and prices, product design, and 
firm strategy.36 These exchanges may make it easier for 
economic actors to reach common understandings regarding 
future behavior,37 and also help firms more readily detect 
deviations by others, thus lessening any incentive to deviate.38 
Like outright collusion, tacit coordination can be difficult to 
detect, and even when it is discovered, proscribing the conduct 
can present its own challenges depending on the particular legal 
rules that apply. Other risks identified with horizontal interlocks 
include foreclosure of rivals, while perceived risks of vertical 
interlocks include preferential treatment of suppliers or 
customers through reciprocal or exclusive dealing, tying 
arrangements, and vertical integration.39 
II. CHARACTERISTICS OF SMALL ECONOMIES AND 
IMPLICATIONS FOR DESIGNING RULES OR STANDARDS TO 
ADDRESS ANTICOMPETITIVE INTERLOCKS 
When considering the appropriate standard or rule to 
adopt with respect to interlocking directorates, it is important to 
take into account the potential harms and benefits described 
above. Whatever approach is adopted ideally would proscribe 
those interlocks that are harmful, while permitting those that 
are beneficial (or at least competitively benign). In other words, 
the standard would minimize error costs associated with false 
                                                                                                                            
36. See Waller, supra note 3, at 858; see also Gabrielsen et al., supra note 9, at 843; 
OECD, Antitrust Issues, supra note 1, at 49. 
37. Gabrielsen et al., supra note 9, at 843. 
38. Id. Gabrielsen et al. conclude, however, that these information exchanges may 
have an ambiguous effect on the stability of any coordination: 
If you have more detailed information on the rival’s most valuable customers 
and products (the highest price-cost margin), your deviation can be targeted 
towards those segments and thereby become more profitable. In that respect, 
it destabilises co-ordination. At the same time, such information will make it 
possible for the firms to directly target certain customers group, which 
typically leads to tougher competition after any deviation. According to this 
effect, information exchange may lead to a more stable co-ordinated 
outcome. 
Id. 
39. OECD, Antitrust Issues, supra note 1, at 49. 
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negatives (i.e., failure to condemn anticompetitive conduct) as 
well as false positives (i.e., condemnations of competitive 
conduct). Increased precision, though, which tends to require 
more complicated market analyses, brings with it higher process 
costs. A full “rule of reason” analysis of management interlocks 
(balancing the anticompetitive harms of the practice in 
particular cases with any precompetitive benefits) therefore may 
have low error costs, in that it would tend to accurately identify 
and condemn only anticompetitive instances, but would bring 
with it high process costs. A bright-line per se rule, in contrast, 
would have low process costs but may have higher error costs. 
Decision theory provides a useful framework for 
determining optimal legal rules or standards in a particular 
context.40 As “a process for making factual determinations and 
decisions when information is costly and therefore imperfect,”41 
decision theory helps to determine, among other things, how 
much information, and what kinds, should be gathered and 
considered in arriving at a decision in a manner that accounts 
for both error costs and process costs.42 Following this approach, 
the pertinent questions to be considered when designing a rule 
or standard to address a particular category of conduct are: (1) 
how frequently pro-competitive (versus anti-competitive) uses of 
that conduct are encountered; (2) what is the magnitude of any 
benefit (versus harms) from that conduct; and (3) whether, 
given unavoidable error costs,43 an alternative rule would, on 
                                                                                                                            
40. See Gal, supra note 6, at 433–34; see also, e.g., Mark S. Popofsky, Section 2, Safe 
Harbors, and the Rule of Reason, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1265, 1275–79 (2008); Arndt 
Christiansen & Wolfgang Kerber, Competition Policy with Optimally Differentiated Rules 
Instead of “Per Se Rules vs Rule of Reason,” 2 J. COMP. L. ECON. 215, 216 (2006); Mark S. 
Popofsky, Defining Exclusionary Conduct, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 435, 449, 453, 457 (2006); 
David S. Evans & A. Jorge Padilla, Excessive Prices: Using Economics to Define Administrable 
Legal Rules, 1 J. COMPETITION L. ECON. 97, 113, 117 (2005); Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. 
Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 266, 272 (1974). 
41. C. Frederick Beckner III & Steven C. Salop, Decision Theory and Antitrust Rules, 
67 ANTITRUST L.J. 41, 41 (1999). 
42. See id. at 44 (“Every decision maker faced with imperfect information must 
resolve three related questions. First, assuming that a decision must be made with 
imperfect information, what is the optimal decision? Second, how much information 
should the decision maker gather and consider in making a decision? Third, if 
information is to be gathered, exactly which information should be considered and in 
what order?”). 
43. As US Supreme Court Justice Breyer noted, economic theory suggests that 
even horizontal price-fixing could be more beneficial than “unfettered competition” 
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balance, “generally improve consumer welfare and 
administration of the [competition] laws.”44 In short, the 
designer must balance error and process costs. 
The insights from decision theory also lead to the 
important conclusion that it is not enough simply to assume that 
an approach that works in one country will necessarily function 
in another. As Professor Michal S. Gal, a leading scholar on 
competition law in small economies, has cautioned: “the special 
characteristics of some economies may change the optimal rules 
because they affect the relative size of process and/or error 
costs.”45 For instance, Chile’s economy is characterized by tight 
oligopolies and by high barriers to entry in important sectors.46 
Moreover, in smaller economies, the “invisible hand” is less 
likely to lead to market self-correction than in larger ones,47 and 
the business elite is more tightly knit and less willing to enter 
                                                                                                                            
under some very limited circumstances. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. 
PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 915 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing F.M. SCHERER & D. 
ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 335–39 (3d ed. 
1990). However, a per se rule against horizontal price fixing agreements is justifiable 
given the potential costs and the difficulties involved in identifying those few scenarios. 
44. Brief of the American Antitrust Institute as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Respondent at 11, Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (Feb. 
26, 2007) (No. 06-480); see Richard M. Brunell, Overruling Dr. Miles: The Supreme Trade 
Commission in Action, 52 ANTITRUST BULL. 475, 495 (2007); Marina Lao, Leegin and 
Resale Price Maintenance—A Model for Emulation or for Caution for the World?, 39 INT’L 
REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 253, 254 (2008) (modern decision theory 
“requires focus . . . on the frequency of [any procompetitive] benefits and 
[anticompetitive] harms, error costs, and whether an alternative rule would better serve 
consumer welfare and the administration of the antitrust law”); see also Christiansen & 
Kerber, supra note 40, at 238 (applying an “error cost approach,” it is “not sufficient to 
show that there are cases in which resale price maintenance can lead to positive welfare 
effects.”). 
45. Gal, supra note 20, at 68. 
46. PATRICK REY, VERTICAL RESTRAINTS—AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 47 (2012), 
available at http://www.fne.gob.cl/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/Vertical-
restraints.pdf (noting that the Chilean economy, like many other small economies, is 
characterized by a relatively high degree of concentration, with some of the most 
important industries having just a few participants). 
47. Michal S. Gal, Size Does Matter: The Effects of Market Size on Optimal Competition 
Policy, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 1437, 1472 (2001) (“[T]he market’s self-correcting tendencies 
are more pronounced in large economies than in smaller ones. In large economies, 
such tendencies are believed to deal effectively with most nonnatural monopolies. This, 
however, cannot as easily be said of small economies. In small economies, market 
conditions are such that the self-correcting forces of the market have a far more limited 
effect . . . .”). 
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each other’s domains.48 In this context, the error costs 
associated with not preventing anti-competitive interlocks (false 
negatives) are likely to be appreciably higher than in larger 
economies.49 At the same time, given the smaller pool of 
available business talent, the error costs of not allowing benign 
or beneficial interlocks may also be somewhat higher. Those 
facts, if true, would need to be taken into account in 
formulating a standard. 
Additionally, particularities with respect to process costs 
also need to be taken into consideration. In small jurisdictions 
like Chile, scarcity of enforcement resources is a significant 
issue, and will likely continue to be an issue even as Chile’s 
wealth continues on its upward trajectory.50 Application of 
complex rules that seek to map the intricacies of economic 
theories may make sense in larger, developed jurisdictions 
where, because of the expertise and sheer resources of the 
enforcement institutions, error costs are often low. In a more 
resource constrained environment, however, enforcement 
agencies will suffer from a more limited ability to perform the 
necessary analysis.51 It is not a given in these circumstances that 
the increased process costs of pursuing a more complex rule will 
reduce the error costs associated with a simpler rule. Moreover, 
those resources expended in enforcing the more complex rule 
(which may or may not reduce error costs) also translate into 
lower levels of overall enforcement. Those trade-offs should also 
be taken into account in formulating an approach.52 
Based on this discussion, a few observations are in order 
regarding an appropriate standard for management interlocks 
in the Chilean context in particular (and more broadly, for 
other small and emerging economies). 
First, management interlocks are not intrinsically 
problematic; rather, only certain interlocks pose such problems. 
                                                                                                                            
48. Id. at 1448. 
49. Gabrielsen et al., supra note 9, at 837 (“Minority share ownership, interlocking 
directorships and other links between competitors have been something of a headache 
in competition law for decades. This is particularly so in oligopolistic markets, where 
the anti-competitive effect of various forms of structural links may be particularly 
visible.”). 
50. Gal, supra note 6, at 421. 
51. Id. at 435. 
52. See id. at 437. 
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Therefore, the standard cannot be too restrictive such that it 
unduly restricts those instances in which interlocks would be 
beneficial or otherwise competitively benign. 
Second, the standard must nevertheless recognize that a 
certain subset of interlocks—those that either directly or indirectly 
involve competitors—have a significant potential for causing 
serious harm, and therefore are worthy of some kind of 
enforcement activity. 
Third, given the nature of Chile’s economy, it would be 
preferable to err on the side of caution with respect to 
competitively suspect interlocks. The error costs of false 
negatives, which could result in cartelization or the softening of 
competition in oligopolistic markets, are potentially enormous. 
On the other hand, the costs of false positives (foregone benefits 
described in the prior section) are small in comparison. Indeed, 
the asymmetry seems so large that even if only some fraction of 
competitor interlocks results in actual harm, the balance would 
still favor a bias towards preventing false negatives. 
Fourth, given relatively low error costs of false positives on 
the margins, the process costs of engaging in additional inquiry, 
through a rule of reason, to eliminate those instances would 
have to be very low to be worthwhile. 
Fifth, whatever net benefits might be obtainable by 
engaging in a refined analysis of suspect interlocks must be 
weighed against the impact on overall enforcement efforts by an 
agency with limited resources.53 
As will be described in the following parts, section 8 of the 
Clayton Act—which adopts a relatively bright-line rule that is 
also limited in reach—provides a reasonable model for satisfying 
these considerations. 
                                                                                                                            
53. The most recent annual budget for the FNE was around US$8.6 million, for a 
country with a population of around 16.6 million. By contrast, the budget for Canada’s 
Competition Bureau, for a country just over twice the size, with 35.2 million 
inhabitants, was around US$41.9 million. See Rating Enforcement 2013, GLOBAL 
COMPETITION REV., available at http://globalcompetitionreview.com/surveys/survey/
828/rating-enforcement-2013/. 
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III. TREATMENT OF INTERLOCKS BY CHILE’S COMPETITION 
AUTHORITIES 
As noted above, the Chilean competition authorities have 
addressed situations in which interlocks (and other structural 
links, such as minority shareholdings) have raised competitive 
concerns.54 The mechanism used in these instances is similar to 
that most commonly employed in the European Union and 
other jurisdictions that do not have specific provisions in their 
competition laws dealing with interlocks. Often, this occurs 
during the merger review process—a fact that complicates the 
situation in Chile even further given that the country does not 
have a mandatory pre-merger notification system.  
Chile’s Competition Act establishes a broad prohibition 
against individual or collective acts or agreements “that impede, 
restrict or hinder competition, or that tend to produce such 
effects.”55 This general statement is then followed by 
descriptions of typical behaviors that can harm competition, 
including express or tacit agreements among competitors that 
confer market power,56 abuses of dominance by a single actor or 
group of actors,57 and predatory practices or unfair competition 
with the objective of obtaining, maintaining, or increasing a 
dominant position.58 The important point, however, is that this 
list is non-exhaustive,59 and therefore the prohibition set forth in 
                                                                                                                            
54. FNE, Minority Shareholdings, supra note 8, at 45. The first cases dealing with 
structural links between competitors were considered by the Comisiones Resolutivas 
(predecessors to TDLC), although these generally dealt with minority ownership 
interests, not management interlocks. Id. 
55. Decree No. 211, art. 3 of Dec. 22, 1973 (Chile), amended by Decree No. 511 
of Oct. 27, 1980 (Chile), Law No. 19,610 of May 19, 1999 (Chile), & Law No. 19,806 of 
May 31, 2002 (Chile). The first paragraph of Article 3 provides in full: 
Any person entering into or executing, individually or collectively, any action, 
act or agreement that impedes, restricts or hinders competition, or that will 
tend to have such effects, will be sanctioned with the measures set forth in 
Article 26 of the present law, without prejudice to preventative, corrective or 
prohibitive measures that, with respect to said acts, actions or agreements, 
may be applied in each case. 
Id. (translation provided by author).’ 
56. Id. art. 3(a). 
57. Id. art. 3(b). 
58. Id. art. 3(c). 
59. The second paragraph of Article 3 provides that “[a]mong others, the following 
will be considered to be acts, actions or agreements that impede, restrict or hinder 
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Article 3 allows for the Competition Act to reach all types of 
conduct, whether individual or collective, that not only harms 
competition but that also might tend to do so. Thus, to the 
extent that management interlocks pose risks to competition 
that are not counterbalanced by significant efficiencies, they 
should be subject to oversight by Chile’s competition 
enforcement institutions, notwithstanding the lack of any 
specific mention of the practice in the Competition Act itself.60 
Prior to the establishment of the TDLC in 2004, the only 
instance in which the predecessor competition commissions 
directly addressed the potential effects of interlocks arose in the 
context of a complaint by Celulosa Arauco y Constitución S.A. 
(Arauco) against Carter Holt Harvey, two competitors in Chile’s 
important forestry products industry.61 Arauco complained that 
its main competitor sought to place one of its representatives on 
the Arauco board in order to gain access to confidential 
business information, including strategic plans.62 
Notwithstanding the apparent competitive risks, the 
Commission dismissed the complaint because it concluded that 
Arauco—given a complex ownership structure—was actually a 
subsidiary of Carter Holt as a result of a prior acquisition by the 
latter of a fifty percent interest in an investment company that 
owned Arauco.63 The Commission concluded that the right of 
the company to place a representative on the Arauco board 
simply flowed from its capacity as a parent company.64 The 
earlier Carter Holt transaction was not itself questioned, 
highlighting the particular risks that can arise with respect to 
addressing interlocks when a jurisdiction, like Chile, does not 
have a mandatory pre-merger notification system in place. 
The TDLC itself first imposed conditions implicating 
management interlocks in the context of authorizing a merger 
                                                                                                                            
competition or that might tend to produce such effects,” before setting forth the 
examples just described. Id. art. 3 (emphasis added). 
60. See FNE, Minority Shareholdings, supra note 8, at 39–40. 
61. Comisión Resolutiva [Antitrust Commission], Resolución 458 (1996) (Chile); 
see FNE, Minority Shareholdings, supra note 8, at 80–81. 
62. Comisión Resolutiva [Antitrust Commission], Resolución 458. 
63. Arauco was owned by Compañía de Petróleos de Chile (“COPEC”), a subsidiary of 
Inversiones y Desarrollo Los Andes S.A., which itself was fifty percent owned by Carter Holt 
Harvey. Carter Holt, in turn, was controlled by International Paper Co. Id. 
64. Id. 
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between VTR and its primary competitor in Chile’s cable 
television industry, Metropolis Intercom. In approving the 
acquisition, the TDLC prohibited the merged company from 
“engag[ing] directly or indirectly, or through related 
persons . . . in the ownership of companies operators via satellite 
or microwave in Chile.”65 The TDLC resolution also precluded it 
from “participat[ing], directly or indirectly” in certain dominant 
companies in the fixed telephony market.66 These conditions 
required VTR parent Liberty to divest its ten percent interest in 
Sky Multi-Country Partners, parent of satellite television 
provider Sky Chile. Moreover, when considered together, the 
regulations eliminated the possibility of the merged company 
engaging in any of the most common forms of direct and 
indirect interlocks in the industry.67 
The FNE also has dealt with potentially anticompetitive 
interlocks in at least two investigations. The first arose in the 
context of a merger involving the acquisition by Cencosud 
S.A.—owner of one of Chile’s largest department store chains—
of an eighty-six percent ownership interest in Johnson’s, a 
competing department store. The remaining fourteen percent 
remained in the hands of a group that held shares in Ripley 
                                                                                                                            
65. Tribunal de Defensa de la Libre Competencia [T.D.L.C.] [Competition 
Tribunal] 25 octubre 2004, Liberty Comunicaciones de Chile Uno Ltda. y Cristalchile 
Comunicaciones S.A., (also known as “Fusión entre VTR y Metrópolis Intercom”) 
Resolución 1/2004 p.50 (Chile). 
66. Id. 
67. FNE, Minority Shareholdings, supra note 8, at 82. The only other case in which 
the Competition Tribunal required the sale of a minority stake in a competitor as a 
condition of approving a merger involved supermarket chain SMU. In its resolution, 
the TDLC questioned SMU’s forty percent interest in another competitor, 
Supermarkets Montserrat, which was not part of the transaction. Tribunal de Defensa 
de la Libre Competencia [T.D.L.C.][Competition Tribunal] 12 diciembre 2012, 
Consulta de SMU sobre los efectos en la libre competencia de la fusión de las 
sociedades SMU S.A. y Supermercados del Sur S.A., Resolución 43/2012 pp. 41, 115 
(Chile). Notwithstanding SMU’s lack of control over Monserrat, the TDLC recognized 
the competitive risks that can arise in the context of minority shareholdings and 
ordered the divestment of its interest as a condition of approving the transaction. Id. 
The same competitive questions regarding structural links between competitors can be 
seen in the various questions resolved by the TDLC regarding a regulation previously 
imposed by the predecessor Comisión Preventativa Central in the port sector. See 
Comisión Preventativa Central [C.P.C.][Central Preventative Commission], 21 agosto 
1998, “Solicitud de las Empresas Portuarias sobre aplicación de los Arts. 14 y 23 de la 
Ley No. 19.542,” Rol de la causa: 102-98, Dictamen 1045, p.13–14 (Chile) (establishing 
various limitations on vertical and horizontal links between port operators). 
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Corp. S.A., another major Chilean department store chain. The 
result was not a direct interlock but rather an indirect one. 
While Johnson’s limited position in the market led the FNE to 
rule out unilateral risks to competition from the transaction, 
there was a concern that the connection with Ripley created 
risks of coordinated conduct. As the FNE noted: 
From the point of view of competition, the connections that 
would exist between two companies, either through 
ownership or administrative links with each other, may be 
the subject of condemnation primarily because of the 
possibility of relevant and sensitive information flowing 
between them, facilitating, principally, the possibility of 
coordination between two economically independent 
companies. Furthermore, these relationships may reduce 
the competitive pressure between the two entities with 
ownership or management intertwined.68 
In order to address the FNE’s concerns and to decrease the 
chances of coordinated action between Ripley and Cencosud, 
the two companies established a series of measures, which 
included a commitment by the minority shareholders in 
Johnson’s not to participate in the management and 
administration of Johnson’s or any other company in the 
Cencosud group, as long as they maintained their holdings in 
Ripley.69 
A second instance raising concerns about anticompetitive 
interlocks involved the wood pulp market and arose in the 
course of an investigation of an alleged market allocation 
agreement between competitors in that market.70 During the 
investigation, the FNE became aware of the existence of a 
minority interest (11.03%) by the Matte Group in Copec S.A., an 
investment that allowed Bernardo Matte Larrain to be named to 
the company’s board. This resulted in structural and personal 
links between CMPC Celulose (on whose board Matte also 
served) and Copec S.A., the parent company (with a 99.9% 
interest) of Arauco y Constitución S.A., the only national 
                                                                                                                            
68. See Operación de Concentración Cencosud-Johnson’s, FISCALIA NACIONAL 
ECONÓMICA [FNE] [NATIONAL ECONOMIC PROSECUTOR’S OFFICE] (Dec. 22, 2011), 
http://www.fne.gob.cl/ 2011/12/22/operacion-de-concentracion-cencosud-johnson´s. 
69. Id. 
70. See Informe de Archivo de la Investigación, 27 noviembre 2012, Rol-1533-09. 
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competitor of CMPC Celulose in the relevant market.71 Despite 
this link, the agency did not pursue the investigation further 
because it was unable to establish the existence of a market 
allocation agreement.72 While the presence of common 
directors and ownership links between firms might have been 
considered as a “plus-factor,” the FNE found that these 
structures were insufficient by themselves to establish the 
existence of such an agreement between competitors.73 
While the general nature of Chile’s Competition Act allows 
the country’s competition authorities to deal with interlocks in a 
variety of contexts, the available tools nevertheless appear to be 
inadequate to deal appropriately with the many types of 
structural links between competitors that may cause competitive 
risks. Even if Chilean law allows for potentially anticompetitive 
interlocks to be reviewed without a “change of control” (as in 
some other jurisdictions), the absence of a mandatory 
notification system prior to the establishment of such links 
suggests that, in most instances, these interlocks will be detected 
only after they already have been constituted, as was the 
situation in some of the cases described above. Furthermore, 
when considered merely as “plus factors” in the context of an 
investigation into collusive conduct, the focus is no longer on 
the risks that interlocks can pose with respect to coordination, 
but instead shifts to whether the burden of proof for collusion 
has been satisfied in a particular instance. Neither approach 
appears to be well suited to addressing, in the context of a small 
economy with concentrated markets, anticompetitive interlocks 
with the goal of preventing anticompetitive harms from 
materializing in the first place. 
                                                                                                                            
71. Id. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. Following this case, and in the presence of this regulatory vacuum, the 
FNE’s Research Division was asked to undertake the preparation of a document 
identifying the possible measures that could be taken against management interlocks 
and other structural links between competitors that increase the risk of facilitating 
coordination or conscious parallelism but that may not themselves constitute an 
anticompetitive agreement. See FNE, Minority Shareholdings, supra note 8, at 89. 
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IV. CLAYTON ACT SECTION 8: AN APPROPRIATE 
COMPROMISE BETWEEN ACCURACY 
AND ADMINISTRABILIT 
The US approach to dealing with potentially problematic 
management interlocks dates back to 1914 with the enactment 
of section 8 of the Clayton Act.74 The statute provides in relevant 
part: 
No person75 shall, at the same time, serve as a director or 
officer in any two corporations (other than banks, banking 
associations, and trust companies76) that are . . . by virtue of 
their business and location of operation, competitors, so 
that the elimination of competition by agreement between 
them would constitute a violation of any of the antitrust 
laws77 . . . if each of the corporations has capital, surplus, 
and undivided profits aggregating more than $10,000,000 as 
adjusted pursuant to paragraph (5) of this subsection78 
[currently US$23,883,00079]. 
                                                                                                                            
74. See Rosch, supra note 2, at 17 (noting that concerns about “[i]nterlocking 
directorates became such a hot-button political issue in the 1912 [presidential] election 
that all three political party platforms called for legislation to address the subject”). 
75. The Clayton Act defines “person” to include “corporations”: 
The word “person” or “persons” wherever used in this Act shall be deemed to 
include corporations and associations existing under or authorized by the 
laws of either the United States, the laws of any of the Territories, the laws of 
any State, or the laws of any foreign country. 
15 U.S.C. § 12(a) (2012). Interlocks involving other types of business entities, such as 
partnerships, are not reached. See North Am. Soccer League v. NFL, 670 F.2d 1249, 
1262 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding that Section 8 does not apply to sports leagues). 
76. In addition, Section 8 also does not reach interlocking directorates between 
bank and nonbank corporations. See Bankamerica Corp. v. United States, 462 U.S. 122, 
128 (1983). 
77. Because liability arises for interlocks only when an agreement between the 
corporations involved “would constitute a violation of any of the antitrust laws,” section 
8 does not apply to interlocks between parent corporations and their wholly owned 
subsidiaries. See, e.g., Burnup & Sims, Inc. v. Posner, 688 F. Supp. 1532, 1534 (S.D. Fla. 
1988). Under Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771–74 (1984), 
a parent company and its wholly owned subsidiary are not considered separate entities, 
and thus are legally incapable of conspiring for purposes of section 1 of the Sherman 
Act. What is less clear is the applicability of section 8 to partially-owned subsidiaries. See 
ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 427 (6th ed. 2007) 
[hereinafter ABA, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS]. 
78. § 19(a).  
79. Revised Jurisdictional Thresholds of the Clayton Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 2675 (Jan. 
14, 2013). 
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Section 8 is limited in both ambition and reach. It 
proscribes interlocks, but not every interlock. It applies only to 
interlocks involving corporations that are horizontal 
competitors. While not necessarily encompassing the universe of 
potentially anticompetitive interlocks, the statute nevertheless 
draws a line that likely captures the most competitively suspect 
ones. Even with respect to direct competitor interlocks, however, 
section 8 exempts those that are most likely to present only a de 
minimis risk of anticompetitive harm given the size of the 
corporations involved. These exemptions were refined even 
further in 1990, when the US Congress enacted additional 
restrictions on the reach of section 8 regarding transactions 
unlikely to pose competitive harms.80 
Section 8 has generated remarkably little jurisprudence 
during its nearly one hundred-year history.81 That is likely the 
result of the federal courts having adopted a per se construction 
of section 8, which allows a violation to be established with no 
proof of actual anticompetitive effects from the management 
interlock. Moreover, “pragmatic” court decisions involving 
other issues arising under the statute—including the definition 
of “competitors” and whether the statute reaches “indirect” 
interlocks—have further contributed to the ability of section 8 
to reach various manifestations of anticompetitive interlocks. 
                                                                                                                            
80. S. REP. NO. 101-286, at 5–6 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4100, 4103-
04 (“The intent of the committee is to preclude from the prohibition against 
interlocking directors competitive overlaps which are too small to have competitive 
significance in the vast majority of situations.”); see H.R. REP. NO. 101-483, at 7 (1990). 
Prior to the 1990 amendments, the FTC majority, in In re Borg-Warner Corp., 101 F.T.C. 
863, 932 (1983), modified, 102 F.T.C. 1164 (1983), rev’d on other grounds, 742 F.2d 108 
(2d Cir. 1984), held that there was no de minimis defense to a section 8 violation. In a 
footnote, however, the majority suggested that the level of commerce affected might 
play a role in the agency’s exercise of prosecutorial discretion with respect to a 
particular interlock, or in determining the scope of any subsequent order. Courts were 
divided on the de minimis question prior to the 1990 amendments. See William C. 
MacLeod, Interlocks at the Federal Trade Commission: Room for Reason in a “Per Se” Statute?, 
53 ANTITRUST L.J. 1077, 1080–81 (1984). Thus, currently, interlocks involving 
competitors are not prohibited when: (a) competitive sales of either corporation are 
less than an inflation adjusted figure of US$1 million, 15 U.S.C. § 19(a)(2)(A), 
(currently US$2,888,300 for 2013), Revised Jurisdictional Thresholds of the Clayton 
Act, 78 Fed. Reg. at 2675; (b) competitive sales of either corporation are less than two 
percent of that corporation’s total sales, 15 U.S.C. § 19(a)(2)(B); or (c) competitive 
sales of each corporation are less than four percent of the corporation’s total sales. 15 
U.S.C. § 19(a)(2)(C) (2012).  
81. Rosch, supra note 2, at 17. 
2014] COMBATING ANTICOMPETITIVE INTERLOCKS 665 
Combined with the 1990 amendments, these appear to have 
struck a reasonable balance that generally tends to allow 
beneficial or benign interlocks, but does so in a manner that 
avoids making enforcement unreasonably costly. 
A. The Per Se Approach to Finding Violations of Section 8 
The per se approach dates back to a 1953 district court 
ruling in United States v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,82 the “first judicial 
construction” of section 8 since its enactment in 1914. In Sears, 
the defendant argued that the ‘so that’ clause of section 8 
required a showing that a hypothetical merger between the two 
firms would violate section 7 of the Clayton Act,83 which 
prohibits mergers between firms only when “the effect of such 
acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend 
to create a monopoly.”84 The court, however, rejected the 
defendant’s argument and instead held that the statute applied 
when a possible agreement (for instance, on prices) between the 
interlocked parties would contravene “any of the provisions of 
any of the antitrust laws.”85 In short, it concluded that a 
straightforward per se test—under which liability turned on 
whether or not the two firms were or had been competitors—
was the proper one. 
Administrability considerations were important factors in 
the court’s decision to adopt a per se rule in Sears. Examining 
the legislative history of section 8, it concluded that “[t]he 
legislation was essentially preventative,” and that the defendant’s 
position “would defeat the Congressional purpose ‘to arrest the 
creation of trusts, conspiracies and monopolies in their 
incipiency and before consummation.’”86 According to the 
court: 
                                                                                                                            
82. 111 F. Supp. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). 
83. Id. at 616. 
84. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 18) (emphasis added). 
85. Id. at 616–17, 620–21; see Robert Jay Preminger, Deputization and Parent-
Subsidiary Interlocks Under Section 8 of the Clayton Act, 59 Wash. U. L. Rev. 943, 951 (1981) 
(“In so deciding, the district court established a rule, thereafter the standard in section 
8 cases, that a per se violation of the statute occurs” under these circumstances so that 
“it is manifestly difficult for a defendant to successfully rebut an alleged section 8 
violation when the . . . remaining conditions are proven.”). 
86. Sears, 111 F. Supp. at 616–17 (quoting S. REP. No. 698, at 11 (1914)). 
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This conclusion is compelled because of the futility of trying 
to decide whether a given hypothetical merger would violate 
the pertinent sections of the antitrust laws. Such a decision 
would involve a consideration of many factors . . . [which] 
can be applied only in an actual case and not in a 
hypothetical situation . . . . This difficulty suggests that the 
merger test would result in complete nullification of the law 
prohibiting interlocking directorates in all but the rawest 
situation.87 
The per se rule, in contrast, “permits the prohibitory 
features of § 8 to be administered with the full scope which the 
legislators must have contemplated.”88 
The US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in 
Protectoseal Co. v. Barancik, similarly concluded that it did “not 
believe Congress intended the legality of an interlock to depend 
on the kind of complex evidence that may be required in a 
protracted case arising under § 7.”89 As in Sears, the defendant 
in Protectoseal argued that a violation of section 8 could not 
occur unless a merger of the two companies would be unlawful 
under section 7. In rejecting that position, the Seventh Circuit 
concluded that the relevant language of Section 8 “establishes 
rather simple objective criteria for judging the legality of the 
interlock,” and that “a market-wide analysis of competition 
[was] unnecessary” under the statute.90  
In 1990, the US Congress debated whether the section 7 
standard, which had been rejected by the courts, should be 
applied to interlocks under section 8.91 Concerns were raised 
                                                                                                                            
87. Id. at 617 (citations omitted). 
88. Id. As noted below, however, such a standard would have sacrificed the 
simplicity of the existing analysis, while delivering questionable benefits. 
89. 484 F.2d 585, 589 (7th Cir. 1973). In this instance, however, the Seventh 
Circuit may not have been discussing the kind of evidence needed to establish whether 
or not the corporations were competitors, but instead may have been referring to 
whether or not a section 8 violation required a showing that a merger between the 
parties would have violated section 7. 
90. Id. (emphasis added). A recent 2012 ruling from the US Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit, in Robert F. Booth Trust v. Crowley, stated that, under section 8, “a 
district judge must define a market and decide whether a merger between [the 
defendant] and one of the firms interlocked by the directorships would be unlawful.” 
687 F.3d 314, 317 (7th Cir. 2012). The latter part of that statement misstates the 
relevant standard. See infra notes 91–94 and accompanying text. 
91. See Gerber, supra note 3, at 133–34 (“A version of H.R. 29 was proposed 
‘which would [have] permitted an interlock if the two competing corporations would 
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that echoed those expressed by the courts in Sears and 
Protectoseal, including that: 
Such a standard would require a complete competitive 
analysis, covering relevant market definition, entry barreirs 
[sic], etc., before one could tell whether an interlock is 
permissible. This would introduce substantial uncertainty 
and require a great deal of effort on the part of the agencies 
to enforce a law.92 
The US Congress further recognized that these higher 
enforcement costs would mean that “the interlock prohibition 
would effectively be nullified in all but the most egregious 
situations.”93 Thus, the bright-line standard was retained as the 
most appropriate approach given the prophylactic nature of 
section 8, even as per se approaches were being jettisoned in 
other areas of US antitrust jurisprudence around this time.94  
In contrast to the United States, Japan has adopted the very 
standard that was rejected for section 8 by precluding interlocks 
only when “the effect of such an interlocking directorate may be 
substantially to restrain competition in any particular field of 
trade.”95 Unlike with the Clayton Act, the focus of the Japanese 
Antimonopoly Act is not on whether there is simply an interlock 
between competitors.96 Rather, the focus is entirely on the 
effects of the restraint. Korea and Indonesia also follow similar 
                                                                                                                            
be allowed to merge under the standard set forth in section 7 of the Clayton Act.’” 
(quoting H.R. REP. No. 101-483, at 3 (1990)) (alteration in original). 
92. H.R. REP. No. 101-483, at 6. 
93. Id. at 7 (observing that the “Merger Guidelines . . . often work to permit 
mergers of direct market rivals with up to a 35-40 percent marketshare”). 
94. See, e.g., State Oil v. Khan, Inc., 522 U.S. 3 (1997) (adopting the rule of reason 
standard for analyzing maximum resale price agreements); Continental T.V., Inc. v. 
GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (adopting rule of reason standard for analyzing 
non-price vertical restraints). 
95. See Shiteki-dokusen no Kinshi oyobi Köseitorhiki no Kakuho ni Kansuru 
Höritsu [Dokusen Kinshihö] [Act on the Prohibition of Private Monopolization and 
Maintenance of Fair Trade], Act No. 54 of 1947, art. 13 para. 1 (Japan), available at 
http://www.jftc.go.jp/en/legislation_gls/amended_ama09/amended_ama09_04.html. 
96. Article 13 reads in full: 
Neither an officer nor an employee (meaning in this article a person other 
than officers engaged in the business of a company on a regular basis) of a 
company shall hold at the same time a position as an officer of another 
company where the effect of such an interlocking directorate may be 
substantially to restrain competition in any particular field of trade. 
Id. 
668 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 37:643 
approaches, and in all three cases, the requirement that there 
be a showing that the interlock would have an actual effect on 
competition results in an enforcement burden not present with 
section 8.97 
B. Identification of “Competitors” and Other Issues in  
Applying the US Standard 
With the adoption of a per se approach in the United 
States, one of the core remaining questions under section 8 has 
been whether two corporations are “competitors” with one 
another within the meaning of the statute. In answering that 
question, some courts have applied the market definition 
analyses used under the Sherman and Clayton Acts more 
generally.98 Other courts, however, have not restricted 
themselves to using “quantitative market definition analysis 
typically applied in Clayton Act Section 7 merger cases,” but 
rather have employed a more flexible “qualitative analysis” as 
well.99 As with the rejection of an effects analysis, concerns with 
respect to administrability and the policy objectives of section 8 
underlie these decisions as well. 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in TRW, Inc., v. Federal Trade 
Commission provides an example of this truncated approach to 
                                                                                                                            
97. See OECD, Antitrust Issues, supra note 1, at 139–40, 197–201. 
98. ABA, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 77, at 427–28; see Preminger, 
supra note 85, at 948–49 (“[A] policy has developed whereby the courts and the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) apply, by analogy, the ‘line of commerce’ and 
geographic market standard recognized by the Supreme Court in the section 7 merger 
[context] . . . . Although applied in a less than mechanical fashion, these standards 
provide structured criteria by which to test the degree of competition between 
interlocked entities.”). In American Bakeries Co. v. Gourmet Bakers, Inc., for instance, a 
federal district court stated that: 
there are clear antitrust guidelines for determining whether corporations 
compete. For example, the “relevant market test” may be applied . . . . The 
presence of actual competitiveness . . . is determined by two tests: 
(1) Can the two products (the defendant’s and the substitute) be said to 
compete because they are reasonably interchangeable with respect to the uses 
to which they can be put? 
(2) Are the two products actually competitive because there is a high cross-
elasticity of demand on the part of customers? 
515 F. Supp. 977, 980–81 (D. Md. 1981). 
99. Gerber, supra note 3, at 108; see ABA ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra 
note 77, at 428. 
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identifying “competitors” for purposes of section 8.100 In TRW, 
the petitioner-defendants argued that whether they were 
“competitors” should be judged by the standards of cross-
elasticity of demand and reasonable interchangeability of use of 
their products.101 The Court of Appeals, however, rejected the 
defendants’ position and concluded that the prophylactic 
purposes underlying section 8 “would not be well served” by 
such a requirement.102 
The Ninth Circuit gave two principal reasons for its 
conclusion. First, such an inquiry is not conceptually necessary 
given that section 8 only requires that “two alleged ‘competitors’ 
[be] involved and proof that the interlock has an actual 
anticompetitive effect is not required.”103 Second, the Ninth 
Circuit considered the defendants’ proposed standard to be 
“too restrictive.”104 For instance, “while the tests of cross-
elasticity of demand and interchangeability of use may yield 
realistic results in well-established industries,” the court noted 
that they are much less useful in evolving markets still in their 
“infancy.”105 Thus, it concluded that in order to further the 
purpose of the statute, it was also appropriate to consider 
evidence concerning: 
(1) the extent to which the industry and its customers 
recognize the products as separate or competing; (2) the 
extent to which production techniques for the products are 
similar; and (3) the extent to which the products can be said 
to have distinctive customers.106 
The Ninth Circuit’s “qualitative” approach has the 
potential to increase uncertainty, and perhaps in some instances 
to raise enforcement costs. The Court of Appeals itself 
recognized that its approach “may render more difficult the 
process of screening potential directors for compliance with 
section 8.”107 On the other hand, even market definition 
analyses that do not engage in a full competitive analysis can be 
                                                                                                                            
100. See, e.g., 647 F.2d 942 (9th Cir. 1981). 
101. Id. at 946. 
102. Id. at 947. 
103. Id. (citations omitted). 
104. Id. 
105. Id. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. 
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extremely costly,108 and by not requiring such an assessment, 
enforcement costs are reduced. This goes hand-in-hand with the 
approach described above eschewing an effects analysis. 
Moreover, this flexible approach may better facilitate section 8’s 
prophylactic purpose in important sectors of the new economy. 
An additional complication with the US approach is 
whether section 8 reaches not only “direct” interlocks involving 
competitors, but the various “indirect” interlocks described 
above.109 The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and Federal Trade 
Commission (“FTC”) both have taken the position that a 
violation of section 8 may occur when different individuals, 
representing a single person or corporation, serve on boards of 
competitors (as illustrated in FIGURE 2 above).110 This makes 
                                                                                                                            
108. See Gerber, supra note 3, at 131 (noting that “even absent a requirement of 
anticompetitive effect, the cost of quantitative market definition remains a valid 
concern”). 
109. Preminger argues that “[w]hat scant legislative history exists supports the 
contention that Congress did not intend section 8 to extend to interlocks other than 
the more blatant, direct forms that come within the literal meaning of the statute.” 
Preminger, supra note 85, at 951. To the extent that is the case, that may have been a 
function of the fact that “[w]hen the Clayton Act was written the Congress had no 
experience with legislation about interlocking directorates. The provisions of the 
statute were apparently designed to cope with the problems that had become most 
conspicuous during the two previous decades.” FED. TRADE COMM’N, REPORT ON 
INTERLOCKING DIRECTORATES, H.R. DOC. NO. 81-652, at 13 (1951).The staff of the 
House Judiciary Committee’s Antitrust Subcommittee later came to a similar 
conclusion, noting that:  
Divergences in coverage and in treatment [of the Clayton Act anti-interlock 
provisions] manifest the exploratory and experimental nature of the 
legislation. Congress apparently was reluctant to go beyond the specific 
management abuses that had been defined at the time and promulgate a 
consistent policy that would define and deal with the root of the problem. 
STAFF OF THE ANTITRUST SUBCOMM. OF THE H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG., 
REP. ON INTERLOCKS IN CORPORATE MANAGEMENT 28 (1965). But see Reading Int’l. v. 
Oaktree Capital Mgmt. LLC, 317 F. Supp. 2d 301, 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“Indeed, the 
paucity of explicit discussion of this question in the debates surrounding the bill’s 
passage indicates that it was not the particular form that interlocks might take, but 
rather their result, that was the primary concern of Congress in 1914.”). 
110. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Reading Int’l, Inc. v. 
Oaktree Capital Mgm’t LLC, No. 03-CV-1895 (GEL) (THK) (Oct. 1, 2003), at *3, 
available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f201300/201321.pdf (“The United States 
has long taken the position that a corporation or other business entity may violate 
Section 8 of the Clayton Act if its deputies serve as directors or officers of competing 
corporations barred from sharing directors or officers under the statute.”); ABA, 
ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 77, at 428–29; see also Advisory Opinion 
Letter to United Auto Workers, 97 F.T.C. 933 (May 1, 1981) (stating that the FTC 
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sense since the same concerns regarding information exchange 
between competitors can arise regardless of whether the same 
individual serves in an executive capacity with two firms, or 
whether the interlock is accomplished with two or more 
people.111 
A federal district court reached a similar conclusion in 
Reading International v. Oaktree Capital Management LLC, a case 
involving a private equity firm that had significant ownership 
interests in two competing movie theater chains.112 In Reading, 
the equity firm’s president served on the board of one of the 
theater chains, while a principal of the firm was a board member 
of the other chain.113 On the defendant’s motion to dismiss, the 
district court rejected the argument that section 8 could only 
apply to an individual serving simultaneously on two 
competitors’ boards. Rather, the court concluded that the 
plaintiffs could prevail by establishing that the directors’ service 
on the competitors’ boards was not in their individual capacities, 
but rather “as the deputies of [the private equity firm], acting as 
the puppets or instrumentalities of the corporation’s will, such 
that it can legitimately be said “that it is the [firm] as an entity . 
. . which ‘serve[s] as a director’ of both [movie theater 
chains].’”114 According to the court: 
To hold otherwise would be to allow corporations (and 
individuals) to evade antitrust liability simply by designating 
agents to serve their bidding on the boards of competing 
businesses. The purposes of the statute, “to avoid the 
opportunity for the coordination of commercially sensitive 
                                                                                                                            
believes that “a corporation or association may violate Section 8 of the Clayton Act if it 
has representatives or deputies serving simultaneously on the boards of two competing 
corporations”). In United States v. Int’l Ass’n. of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, (No. 94-
0690), 1994 WL 728884 (D.D.C. June 14, 1994), the DOJ challenged a situation in 
which the union simultaneously had different individual representatives serving on the 
boards of two competing airlines. 
111. It also makes sense given that the definition of “person” under the Clayton 
Act includes “corporations and associations.” 15 U.S.C. § 12(a) (2012). Corporations 
and associations, of course, can only act through their human agents. Suez Equity 
Investors, L.P. v. Toronto-Dominion Bank, 250 F.3d 87, 101 (2d Cir. 2001). 
112. Oaktree Capital, 317 F. Supp. 2d at 308 (Oaktree had ownership interests of 
forty percent in Loews and seventy percent of Regal). 
113. Id. at 309. 
114. Id. at 331. 
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information by competitors,” would be ill-served by such a 
cramped reading.115 
With respect to other configurations of indirect interlocks, 
including situations in which a person serves as an officer or 
director of two corporations that are not themselves 
competitors, but that involve subsidiaries (as illustrated in 
FIGURES 3 & 4 above), both the DOJ and the FTC have taken 
enforcement actions premised on such indirect interlocks.116 In 
Borg-Warner Corp., for instance, the FTC concluded that the 
relevant inquiry under section 8 in these circumstances 
is whether the parent company should be regarded as a 
“competitor” of the subsidiary’s competitors, and whether 
an interlocked director is so placed as to be able to exercise 
control or even to substantially influence decision-making at 
the director level so as to dampen competitive relationships 
between divided corporate interests.117 
Federal courts, however, have split on this question. In 
United States v. Crocker National Corp., the Ninth Circuit 
concluded that when a parent “substantially controls the policies 
                                                                                                                            
115. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Square D Co. v. Schneider, 760 F. Supp. 362, 
366 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)). Other courts have also referred to the possibility that section 8 
liability might arise in the case of an indirect lock consisting of different representatives 
from the same entity. In United States v. Cleveland Trust Co., the DOJ alleged that the 
defendant, through two different “agents,” had been a “member” of the boards of two 
direct competitors. 392 F. Supp. 699, 702 (N.D. Ohio 1974), aff’d 513 F.2d 633 (6th Cir. 
1975). The district court, on a motion for summary judgment, did not reject the 
government’s theory as a matter of law (though it noted that the question was “entirely 
unsettled”), but declined to grant the motion because of significant factual questions 
that remained. Id. at 712. In Pocahontas Supreme Coal Co. v. Bethlehem Steel, the US Court 
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit dismissed the plaintiff’s section 8 claim based on a 
representative theory, but did so because the record before the court included only 
“conclusory allegations” that deputization had occurred.” 828 F.2d 211, 217 (4th Cir. 
1987). The appellate court did not reject the theory as a matter of law. For a discussion 
of how “deputization” and parent-subsidiary interlocks were “often used successfully to 
sidestep the express restrictions of [section 8],” thereby threatening the purpose of the 
statute, see Preminger, supra note 85, at 945. 
116. See ABA, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 77, at 429–30. 
117. Borg-Warner Corp., 101 F.T.C. 863, 932, modified, 102 F.T.C. 1164 (1983), 
rev’d on other grounds, 742 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1984). In Borg-Warner, the FTC challenged 
an interlock resulting from the acquisition of Borg-Warner stock by Bosch GmbH, a 
German corporation. Two directors sitting simultaneously on the boards of Bosch 
GmbH and Bosch U.S., the German company’s wholly-owned American subsidiary, 
assumed positions on Borg-Warner’s board. The theory espoused in the FTC complaint 
was that the arrangement constituted an illegal interlock insofar as Bosch U.S. 
competed directly with Borg-Warner. Id. 
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of its subsidiary,” the “business and location” of the parent 
includes that of the subsidiary as well.118 In contrast, the Second 
Circuit, in Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 
overturned the “general rule” adopted by the district court that 
section 8 prohibits interlocking directorates between parent 
companies with subsidiaries that are competitors,119 though that 
ruling may be limited by its facts and is not necessarily 
inconsistent with the pragmatic approach adopted by the Ninth 
Circuit. 
In contrast to section 8, the Japanese Antimonopoly Act 
does not appear to concern itself whatsoever with whether 
“competitors” are involved in the interlock.120 The result is that 
Japan’s approach may be more expansive than the Clayton Act, 
which has been held to apply only to interlocking directorates 
between horizontal competitors,121 whereas the Japanese act 
conceivably could reach even vertical interlocks that affect 
competition.122 The Japanese approach, in theory, also relieves 
enforcers of the burden of establishing that the parties involved 
are competitors. It seems unlikely, however, that the overall 
enforcement burden under the Japanese approach, with a 
requirement of showing possible effects, would be less than in 
the United States, where “competitors” can be (at least in some 
courts) established using a “qualitative” approach.123 
                                                                                                                            
118. 656 F.2d 428, 450-51 (9th Cir. 1981) rev’d sub nom. Bankamerica Corp. v. United 
States, 462 U.S. 122 (1983). 
119. 584 F.2d 1195, 1205 (2d Cir. 1978). 
120. See supra notes 95–96 and accompanying text. 
121. TRW, Inc., 93 F.T.C. 325, 379 (1979), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom, TRW, 
Inc. v. FTC, 647 F.2d 942 (9th Cir. 1981). 
122. While interlocks between suppliers and customers are not reached by section 
8, in theory, these could raise competitive concerns. As the OECD has noted, these 
arrangements “traditionally have been criticized on the ground that they can lead to 
preferential treatment at the expense of other suppliers or customers by facilitating 
reciprocal or exclusive dealing, tying arrangements, and vertical integration.” See 
OECD, Antitrust Issues, supra note 1, at 49. 
123. By its own terms, section 8 has some important limitations that prevent it 
from reaching certain competitor interlocks that nevertheless could raise concerns. For 
instance, the statute applies only to officers or directors, not employees or agents, even 
though interlocks involving the latter could also result in information exchanges or 
other anticompetitive harms. Furthermore, section 8 only applies to officers or 
directors of corporations, but not of other types of business entities, such as partnerships. 
See North Am. Soccer League v. NFL, 670 F.2d 1249, 1262 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding that 
Section 8 does not apply to sports leagues). Moreover, the statute probably does not 
reach interlocks in which individuals from competing corporations sit on a board of a 
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C. Recent Experiences Demonstrate the Benefits of the US Model 
The relatively low-cost and on-balance predictable nature of 
the bright-line rule for interlocks in the United States translates 
into some real benefits with respect to enforcement, which are 
particularly important when considering emerging economies in 
which agency resources are (in relative terms) scarce. Section 8 
can be enforced by the DOJ, the FTC, or by private parties, and 
in theory, remedies in private actions theoretically could include 
treble damages, although there do not appear to be any 
instances in which monetary awards have been given.124 Rather, 
when disputes arise, the typical remedy involves the resignation 
of a director from one of the two corporations,125 or sometimes 
the divestiture of a business line so the firms are no longer 
competitors, and, thus, no longer subject to the statute’s 
prohibitions.126 
                                                                                                                            
non-competing company, or interlocks involving family members or close friends, even 
though, again, these forms could also lead to anticompetitive results. See Rosch, supra 
note 2, at 18. Nevertheless, even when section 8 does not apply, other legal 
prohibitions may exist regarding management interlocks. For instance, section 305 of 
the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 825d(b) (2012), prohibits individuals—absent prior 
authorization from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission—from being an officer 
or director of more than one public utility or from holding such a position with a 
public utility and a company that may underwrite or market public utility securities. 
Similar sector-specific restrictions have been enacted in other industries as well. See, 
e.g., Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 § 17(c), 15 U.S.C. § 79q(c) (repealed 
2005) (regulating interlocks involving public utility holding companies); Investment 
Company Act of 1940 § 10(b)(2), (c), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(b)(2), (c) (regulating 
interlocks between registered investment companies and, respectively, underwriters 
and bank officers, directors or employees); Communications Act of 1934 § 212, 47 
U.S.C. § 212 (regulating interlocks between communications carriers). Some states have 
enacted similar prohibitions that apply even when firms do not meet the minimum 
monetary thresholds for Section 8. See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 45.50.570 (2013); Wis. Stat. § 
133.06 (2013). Further, the FTC has challenged interlocks that did not violate section 8 
by means of section 5 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45, which prohibits “unfair methods 
of competition,” and can be used to reach conduct that is not necessarily proscribed by 
other antitrust statutes. See Rosch, supra note 2, at 19–20 (citing Kraftco Corp., 89 
F.T.C. 46, remanded on other grounds sub nom., SCM Corp. v. FTC, 565 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 
1977), appeal after remand, 612 F.2d 707 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 821 
(1980)). 
124. See ABA, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 77, at 430. 
125. Under the statute, a person who becomes ineligible to serve as an officer or 
director of a competitor due to some intervening event has a one-year grace period 
from the time of that event in which they can continue in that position. See 15 U.S.C. § 
19(b). 
126. See Gerber, supra note 3, at 131. 
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The federal government rarely sues under section 8.127 In 
fact, the most recent contested case brought by the government, 
Borg-Warner, was filed thirty-five years ago.128 While this may be 
due in part to section 8 enforcement having experienced 
“periods of benign neglect” over its history,129 in recent years 
both the DOJ and FTC have addressed management 
interlocks—with the FTC having pursued a particularly high-
profile matter involving Google and Apple.130 Rather, the dearth 
of section 8 litigation is more likely attributable to government 
enforcement having become largely “administrative” in nature. 
As Judge Easterbrook recently described that process, “[w]hen 
the [DOJ] or the FTC concludes that directorships improperly 
overlap, it notifies the firm and gives it a chance to avoid 
litigation (or to convince the enforcers that the interlock is 
lawful).”131 While there may be disputes about the parties’ status 
                                                                                                                            
127. See Robert F. Booth Trust v. Crowley, 687 F.3d 314, 319 (7th Cir. 2012) 
(estimating the odds of a lawsuit by the DOJ or FTC for the challenged interlock at less 
than one percent); see also Preminger, supra note 85, at 952 n.41 (noting that from 
1914 to 1965 the DOJ had filed only ten cases alleging violations of section 8, while the 
FTC filed thirteen lawsuits in that time, with all but one resulting in dismissal upon 
voluntary dissolution of the interlock). 
128. See Crowley, 687 F.3d at 319. 
129. See J. Randolph Wilson, Unlocking Interlocks: The On-Again Off-Again Saga of 
Section 8 of the Clayton Act, 45 ANTITRUST L.J. 317, 317 (1976) (describing DOJ and FTC 
enforcement of section 8 as having “been punctuated by a few bursts of mild activity 
and then followed by long periods of benign neglect”). 
130. In this way, section 8 enforcement is entirely unlike the not-so-benign neglect 
of the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (2012), which prohibits unfair price 
discrimination on the sale of goods to equally-situated distributors when the effect is to 
reduce competition. Government enforcement of the Robinson-Patman Act has been 
curtailed significantly since the 1960s, and the Antitrust Modernization Commission 
recommended in its April 2007 report that the statute be repealed. See ANTITRUST 
MODERNIZATION COMM’N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 38 (April 2007) 
(“Congress should repeal the Robinson-Patman Act in its entirety.”). 
131. Crowley, 687 F.3d at 319. Indeed, this “administrative” approach appears to 
have been the norm for a far longer period, as one commentator describes the process 
in an article from 1950: 
The Department of Justice’s extra-judicial procedure for wholesale 
enforcement of Section 8 is a novel antitrust enforcement technique. It has 
been customary to correct alleged violations by instituting lawsuits. But if 
enforcement by administrative persuasion accomplishes the objectives of the 
statute, that method would seem to be not only in the public interest but also 
in the interests of the persons whose directorships are questioned since it 
gives them an opportunity to resign without publicity and its attendant 
unpleasantness . . . . In Section 8 matters, the relief is simple and specific: 
resignation from all but one of the boards of the competing corporations.  
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as “competitors” or whether the statute applies to a particular 
“indirect” interlock, the legal analysis under section 8 (as 
described above) is otherwise generally quite straightforward—
something that could not necessarily be said under an effects 
standard.132 Because of the per se standard followed by the 
courts, the likely outcome is more certain and predictable. 
Moreover, if a violation of section 8 has occurred, the 
investigated corporations usually can resolve the matter at 
relatively low cost, with the resignation of a board member or 
divestiture of a line of business.133 As a result, “[f]or more than 
30 years, this process has enabled antitrust enforcers to resolve § 
8 issues amicably—either avoiding litigation or entering consent 
decrees contemporaneous with a suit’s initiation.”134 This 
dynamic is illustrated by some examples of recent enforcement 
activity in the United States. 
As noted above in the case of Chile and elsewhere, 
interlock issues sometimes arise in the merger context. Section 8 
has been used in the United States to address those concerns 
when they arise in that situation. One recent example involves 
the December 2007 consent decree in United States v. CommScope. 
In that matter, CommScope, a manufacturer of wire and cable 
products, including drop cable and related hardware, acquired 
another company, Andrew, that had recently sold its own drop 
cable manufacturing business to a third company, Andes. 
Andrews, in turn, held a thirty percent equity stake in Andes at 
the time of the acquisition, and enjoyed other governance 
rights, including the right to designate various board 
members.135 Those rights became a source of concern for the 
                                                                                                                            
Victor H. Kramer, Interlocking Directorships and the Clayton Act After 35 Years, 59 YALE L.J. 
1266, 1271 (1950); see Ephraim Jacobs, Interlocks, 29 ANTITRUST L.J. 204, 209 (1965) 
(describing “voluntary compliance” with Section 8). For a less sanguine view, see 
Preminger, supra note 85, at 952–53 (arguing that “[d]espite the efficiency of these 
summary enforcement techniques, their use detracts from the deterrence value of the 
statute” and that “[t]he paucity of reasoned decisions on the merits in section 8 cases 
gives the statute less coherence and predictability of interpretation than a sixty-seven 
year old law would normally warrant” (citations omitted)). 
132. See supra Part IV; see also Waller, supra note 3, at 857 (describing the typical 
disputes as “boundary” issues). 
133. See Waller, supra note 3, at 857. 
134. Crowley, 687 F.3d at 319. 
135. Competitive Impact Statement at 7, United States v. CommScope, Inc., 2008 WL 
3978124 (No. 07-2200) (D.D.C. 2008). 
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DOJ because, the agency concluded, CommScope and Andes 
were each other’s closest competitors for many customers. The 
rights would thus give CommScope “both the incentive and the 
ability to coordinate its activities with those of Andes, and/or to 
undermine Andes’ ability to compete on price and 
innovation.”136 To ameliorate those concerns, the DOJ required 
the parties—as a condition to its approval of the transaction—to 
renounce their governance rights, including CommScope’s 
right to appoint members of Andes’ board.137 
Even in jurisdictions that do not follow the US model, it 
may be possible to analyze the potential competitive effect of 
management interlocks during merger reviews. As noted above, 
Chile’s competition authorities have been able to address the 
practice in certain instances, even though the Competition Act 
does not specifically address interlocking directorates.138 In the 
European context, however, it has been noted that that law does 
not address the issue “in a coherent way,” and consequently 
“minority shareholdings, cross-shareholdings and interlocking 
directorships have been allowed to develop in a wide range of 
markets.”139 In Chile, which does not have a comprehensive 
merger regulation like the European Union, the regulatory gap 
for dealing with questionable interlocks during the merger 
review process can be expected to be even greater. From an 
enforcement perspective, relying on merger reviews for 
addressing potentially anticompetitive interlocks does not 
appear to be an optimal solution, producing too many false 
negatives. 
Apart from interlocks that arise in connection with 
mergers, however, competitive concerns can also arise in 
situations that do not involve reviewable transactions, such as 
                                                                                                                            
136. Id. at 8. 
137. Id. at 10. In the context of EU merger reviews, divestiture or reduction of 
minority ownership interests outside of the transaction under review have been offered 
and accepted by the Commission in various cases. See Gabrielsen et al., supra note 9, at 
846. This demonstrates some flexibility in terms of the merger review process being 
able to address management interlocks that may not have arisen from the merger itself. 
However, as discussed below, there are other instances of management interlocks that 
could not be reached under this mechanism. 
138. See supra Part III. 
139. Gabrielsen et al., supra note 9, at 855. For a discussion of merger reviews in 
the European Union that also involved minority ownership links and management 
interlocks, see id. at 845–46. 
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when corporations expand into new markets and lines of 
business. The FTC’s investigation regarding a management 
interlock between Apple and Google provides a good example 
of this. When the FTC began its inquiry in 2009, Apple and 
Google shared two directors: Eric Schmidt, who was CEO of 
Google, and Arthur Levinson, former CEO of Genentech. Dr. 
Schmidt became an Apple director in August 2006,140 at a time 
when Apple and Google were working to integrate various 
Google technologies, such as search and Google Maps, into 
Apple’s iPhone, then under development. Following Apple’s 
announcement of the iPhone in January 2007, however, Google 
unveiled its Android mobile device platform in November of 
that year and the two companies became major competitors in 
the smart phone market.141 Indeed, Apple’s fortunes were 
increasingly seen as tied to mobile devices, and Google viewed 
the mobile arena as a strategic opportunity for expanding its 
advertising services. It was this competitive overlap that 
presumably became the source of the FTC’s concerns,142 and 
ultimately led to Dr. Schmidt’s resignation from Apple’s board 
in August 2009,143 as well as Mr. Levinson’s from Google’s in 
October 2009.144  
                                                                                                                            
140. See Google CEO Dr. Eric Schmidt Joins Apple’s Board of Directors, PR NEWSWIRE 
(August 29, 2006), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/google-ceo-dr-eric-
schmidt-joins-apples-board-of-directors-56271542.html. 
141. In addition, Apple’s Safari web browser competed with Google’s Chrome, 
and Google Internet properties, such as YouTube, and Apple’s iTunes became rival 
distribution vehicles for music and videos. See Miguel Helft, Board Ties at Apple and 
Google Are Scrutinized, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/05/
technology/companies/05apple.html. 
142. Id. 
143. Fed. Trade Comm’n, Statement of Bureau of Competition Director Richard 
Feinstein Regarding the Announcement that Google CEO Eric Schmidt Has Resigned from 
Apple’s Board (Aug. 3, 2009), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2009/08/googlestmt.shtm. Given 
the increased rivalry between Apple and Google in smart phones, it is reasonable to ask 
whether Dr. Schmidt would have been able to continue in his role on Apple’s board 
even without an FTC investigation. See Josh Quittner, Why Google’s Schmidt Resigned from 
Apple’s Board, TIME (August 3, 2009), http://www.time.com/time/business/article/
0,8599,1914350,00.html (“In a shockingly unsurprising move, Google CEO Eric 
Schmidt resigned from Apple Inc.’s board of directors today. This was inevitable, since 
both companies are staking their future growth on the explosion in mobile 
computing.”). 
144. Fed. Trade Comm’n, Statement of Chairman Jon Leibowitz Regarding the 
Announcement that Arthur D. Levinson Has Resigned from Google’s Board, (Oct. 12, 2009), 
http:// www.ftc.gov/opa/2009/10/google.shtml. 
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Again, in jurisdictions like Chile that do not follow the US 
model, it might be possible to reach interlocks arising outside of 
the merger context under the substantive competition laws.145 
Without section 8 as an available option, however, it does not 
seem likely that resolution of the competitive concerns arising 
from the Google-Apple interlock would have been possible, at 
least not at such an early stage or in an equally efficient manner. 
This is seen in the Chilean examples described above, where 
competitively-suspect interlocks have been allowed to remain. In 
contrast, the FTC was able to intervene in the Google-Apple 
matter at an early stage, before the interlock presumably could 
have resulted in any actual violation of the substantive laws or 
caused any anticompetitive harm. That is precisely what 
section 8 is intended to prevent. Moreover, the FTC was able to 
address the interlock without the need to satisfy the more 
rigorous requirements of a substantive violation—a far more 
costly proposition for the agency.146 Under an alternative model 
                                                                                                                            
145. Gabrielsen et al., supra note 9, at 855–58 (discussing the availability of Article 
101 TFEU as a potential mechanism for intervening ex post to deal with information 
exchanges arising from management interlocks and other minority ownership links). 
146. Another similar FTC investigation may have been responsible for the 
announcement in March 2010 that famed venture capitalist John Doerr would be 
resigning from Amazon’s board of directors later that year. At the time of the 
announcement, Mr. Doerr had been a director of both Amazon and Google. According 
to the New York Times, “Mr. Doerr’s decision was prompted by a Federal Trade 
Commission inquiry” into ties between the two companies. See Miguel Helft, F.T.C. Is 
Said to Have Looked Into Amazon-Google Ties, N.Y. TIMES, April 1, 2010, http://
bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/04/01/f-t-c-is-said-to-have-looked-into-amazon-google-ties. 
As in the case involving Apple, it was Google’s evolving competitive relationship with 
Amazon that reportedly drew the attention of the FTC: 
While Amazon remains primarily an e-commerce company and Google an 
online advertising giant, competition between the two companies has 
intensified in recent years. Both companies offer so-called cloud computing 
services to start-up companies and others. What’s more, the two are quickly 
becoming rivals in the competitive electronic books market . . . . 
Id. To the extent that Mr. Doerr’s departure was the result of an FTC investigation, it—
like the resolution of the Apple and Google interlock—was accomplished without the 
need for litigation. Similarly, any investigation was not initiated in connection with a 
reviewable merger or similar transaction, but in response to concerns that arose as 
Google and Amazon’s business came into competition with one another. Given the 
further intensification of competition between Google and Amazon since 2010—in 
electronic books and other digital content, including music and movies—this 
presumptive example further illustrates the importance of section 8’s prophylactic 
nature and the flexibility it provides for regulators to respond to developing concerns 
in emerging markets. 
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that relies on higher-stakes litigation, the benefits of section 8’s 
“administrative” enforcement might not materialize. 
V. THE LOW COST, ADMINISTRABLE APPROACH OF 
SECTION 8 PROVIDES A SUITABLE TEMPLATE FOR SMALL 
AND EMERGING ECONOMIES 
As described above, section 8 is a “limited” provision, and 
one that is largely prophylactic in nature. The statute identifies 
an area of potential competitive concern—management 
interlocks—and establishes a ban on the practice, but only as to 
those interlocks involving competing corporations, which carry 
the greatest anticompetitive risks. Rather than inquire about the 
competitive effects of an interlock by considering whether a 
combination of the companies involved would violate section 7 
(as some defendants had argued), the courts in Sears and 
Protectoseal opted for a far more administrable per se 
approach.147 But, the statute itself then only applies to interlocks 
between competitors that exceed a certain threshold in terms of 
“capital, surplus, and undivided profits,”148 thereby eliminating 
from coverage interlocks that are unlikely to have market-wide 
anticompetitive effects. Moreover, the additional exemptions 
enacted in 1990, which exclude from section 8 interlocks that 
are likely to have de minimis competitive effects, further refine 
the statute’s scope. 
The sanctions for a violation of section 8 are also, as a 
practical matter, “limited.” As mentioned earlier, the typical 
remedy involves the resignation of a director from one of the 
two corporations, or sometimes the divestiture of a business line 
so the firms are no longer competitors, and thus no longer 
subject to section 8’s prohibitions.149 And while private plaintiffs 
theoretically could recover damages, there do not appear to be 
any instances in which that has occurred.150 Thus, given the 
relatively low stakes involved, combined with the general clarity 
of the per se rule, enforcement of section 8 has tended to follow 
the “amicable” path described by Judge Easterbrook—“either 
                                                                                                                            
147. See supra notes 82–90 and accompanying text. 
148. 15 U.S.C. § 19(a)(1) (2012). 
149. See Gerber, supra note 3, at 131. 
150. See ABA, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 77, at 430. 
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avoiding litigation or entering consent decrees 
contemporaneous with a suit’s initiation.”151 Indeed, more than 
thirty years have elapsed since the last contested Section 8 case 
brought by the government, notwithstanding continued 
enforcement efforts described in the prior section. 
The US model appears to be capable of satisfying the 
criteria described above in Part II, and thus would be a 
reasonable approach for a small, emerging economy like 
Chile’s. An absolute ban on those interlocks involving horizontal 
competitors—whether imposed by an amendment to the 
Competition Act or adopted through case law by the TDLC152—
takes seriously the notion that these carry with them serious risks 
to competition, particularly in a small economy. It perhaps 
sweeps more broadly than a more flexible, case-by-case analysis 
would, and is likely to prohibit some instances of interlocks that 
might be socially beneficial or otherwise benign. The experience 
with section 8, however, shows that the number of false positives 
can be limited by including bright line de minimis exceptions 
that are properly tailored to their environment. Finally, the US 
model allows for enforcement to be carried out at relatively low 
costs. 
The potential advantages of the US approach are most 
apparent in the Matte Group matter discussed above. Recall, 
despite the structural and personal links between CMPC 
Celulose and Arauco y Constitución—two competitors in the 
relevant market—the FNE did not pursue its investigation into a 
competition law violation because it was unable to establish the 
existence of a market allocation agreement between the 
competitors. Regardless of any such agreement in that particular 
case, however, the existence of such links between competitors 
                                                                                                                            
151. Robert F. Booth Trust v. Crowley, 687 F.3d 314, 319 (7th Cir. 2012). 
152. Chilean competition policy generally emphasizes market power, and Article 
3(a) of DL No. 211 speaks in terms of horizontal agreements or concerted practices 
that confer market power on the parties. Although de minimis or per se rules have not 
yet been explicitly recognized in Chile, the Chilean Supreme Court seems to have 
made a move towards allowing something approximating a per se approach in a recent 
joint price fixing decision involving tourism operators. See Corte Suprema de Justicia 
[C.S.J.][Supreme Court], 20 septiembre 2012, “Fiscalía Nacional Económica v Explora 
Chile S.A.,” Rol de la causa: 113-2012. The Court held in that case that even when a 
collusive agreement is not capable of influencing prices or quantities, it could still 
violate the Competition Act. Future cases should elaborate on this point. Id. 
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generally carries with it significant risks. A direct prohibition 
against such interlocks would have made it far easier for the 
FNE to eliminate that risk in this instance—to the extent the 
mere existence of the prohibition did not result in the 
dissolution of the links in the first place—at lower costs, either 
through negotiation with the parties or a simpler proceeding 
before the TDLC that would largely be limited to establishing 
the existence of an interlock and the fact that the interlock 
involved competitors. 
Certainly, implementing a bright line in an imprecise 
manner—either too broadly or narrowly—can create problems 
from corporate governance and competition perspectives.153 For 
instance, an overly-broad application could interfere “unduly 
with selection of executive talent and deprive[] non-competing 
corporations of the numerous innocuous (not anticompetitive) 
benefits that interlocks confer.”154 Conversely, an under-
inclusive application of the statue might not reach all 
management interlocks between corporations that actually are 
meaningful competitors, “such that the statute’s intent to 
prevent collusion is not fully realized.”155 In devising 
administrable rules, however, it is inevitable that business 
practices that “sometimes produce benefits” will sometimes be 
prohibited.156 As noted above, however, the proper focus is 
whether on balance the rule is cost-effective. The search for 
greater precision generally leads to higher enforcement costs,157 
                                                                                                                            
153. See Gerber, supra note 3, at 125–27 (section 8’s proscription of interlocking 
directorates “may in some instances be too broad, restricting corporations that do not 
meaningfully compete, and in other instances be too narrow, permitting interlocks 
between corporations that do meaningfully compete”). Gerber points to F.T.C. v. 
Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066 (D.D.C. 1997), and United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. 
Supp. 2d 1098 (N.D. Cal. 2004)—cases decided under section 7 of the Clayton Act—as 
examples that illustrate how a non-quantitative approach to identifying “competitors” 
under section 8 can be, respectively, too broad or too narrow. In Staples, for instance, 
the court found, based on quantitative econometric evidence, that office supplies sold 
by office supply superstores constituted a separate product market from identical 
products sold in other types of stores. A “qualitative” analysis, by contrast, might have 
identified a broader market. 
154. Gerber, supra note 3, at 109. 
155. Id. 
156. Leegin Creative Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 915 (2007) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
157. In the United States, for instance, the practical difference between litigating 
a bright-line per se case compared to a matter decided under the “rule of reason” is 
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which may or may not be offset by the social benefits of allowing 
competitively beneficial conduct that otherwise would have been 
proscribed under the less precise, but more administrable 
rule.158  
When the US Congress considered—and rejected—a 
proposal that would have prohibited interlocks only when a 
merger between the interlocked firms otherwise would violate 
section 7 of the Clayton Act, similar to the Japanese model, it 
recognized that such a rule would increase enforcement costs 
substantially, rendering enforcement uneconomical: “We would 
be most reluctant to expend such resources to determine 
whether an interlock should be challenged. An interlock does 
not pose the same degree of anticompetitive potential as a 
merger . . . . We favor bright line tests for prophylactic rules.”159 
There are undoubtedly some questions that arise around the 
edges under the US approach, such as whether or not certain 
configurations of interlocks are implicated by the per se ban—
an issue that might be even more problematic in Chile with its 
economic groups that have interests in wide swaths of the 
economy. Nevertheless, as argued above, the analysis is 
substantially less complex than under an “effects” standard and 
remains consistent with the desired bright line approach. 
It might be possible to further refine any prohibition, to 
reduce the number of false negatives, while remaining faithful 
to the per se approach courts have followed. Professor Waller, 
however, convincingly notes that, in the context of interlocks, a 
“clear ‘no’” might be better than a “maybe,” especially when 
viewed ex ante.160 He also remarks that “further precision would 
probably come at such a high cost that the incremental gains would 
not be worthwhile for either competition policy or corporate 
                                                                                                                            
significant. As former FTC Chairman Robert Pitofsky has commented, “rule of reason 
cases often take years to litigate[,] are extremely expensive,” and are “very difficult for 
a plaintiff (either the government or a private party) to win.” Robert Pitofsky, In Defense 
of Discounters: The No-Frills Case for a Per Se Rule Against Vertical Price Fixing, 71 GEO. L.J. 
1487, 1489 (1983). 
158. For an illuminating discussion of how the assignment of burdens of proof 
and the standards for satisfying those burdens can play an important role in 
enforcement of the competition laws (in the context of exclusionary discounts), see 
Robert H. Lande, Should Predatory Pricing Rules Immunize Exclusionary Discounts?, 2006 
UTAH L. REV. 863 (2006). 
159. H.R. REP. No. 101-483, at 6 (1990). 
160. Waller, supra note 3, at 884. 
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governance.”161 Those costs include not only increased expenses 
for the government in enforcing the prohibition in specific 
cases, but also social costs generally if the prophylactic nature of 
the statute is undermined and an increase in anticompetitive 
management interlocks results in increased instances of 
unilateral or coordinated conduct that harms consumers. 
Moreover, to the extent that specific interlocks that do not fall 
under the bright-line ban nevertheless raise serious enough 
competitive concerns so as to infringe the general prohibitions 
of the competition laws, there appears to be no reason those 
could not be independently prosecuted in specific cases. Based 
on the discussion above, Professor Waller’s conclusion appears 
to be a reasonable one. Given the limited nature of a per se ban, 
with appropriately designed de minimis exceptions, further 
refinements to such an easily administrable approach probably 
are not justifiable on a cost-benefit basis. 
Moreover, it should be recognized that the costs associated 
with not adopting some kind of reasonable measure to deal with 
interlocks involving competitors—but instead waiting for a 
violation of the substantive competition laws—can be high. 
Former FTC Commissioner Thomas J. Rosch, in a 2009 speech 
about section 8 enforcement delivered to an audience in Hong 
Kong, commented on the risk of competitor interlocks, and 
then went on to caution that “[t]hese concerns have, if 
anything, only grown in recent years as the government’s burden of 
investigating and litigating price fixing cases has multiplied.”162 Those 
burdens are the result, at least in part, of massive quantities of 
electronic communications and other documents that 
oftentimes must be reviewed and analyzed in connection with a 
complex antitrust case. They also include the social costs of 
undetected anticompetitive conduct that is not avoided by means 
of a reasonable ex ante prohibition. Thus, while the trend in US 
antitrust law has moved away from per se rules, Commissioner 
Rosch suggested that Hong Kong—where firms were linked 
together even more tightly than their US counterparts and the 
number of overlapping directors tended to be higher—“may 
wish to consider emulating the United States.”163 
                                                                                                                            
161. Id. at 858 (emphasis added). 
162. Rosch, supra note 2, at 16 (emphasis added). 
163. Id. at 3. 
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In jurisdictions like Chile, which do not explicitly address 
management interlocks in their respective laws, it may still be 
possible to challenge particular interlocks under the general 
competition laws, or to analyze their effects during the course of 
a merger review.164 As discussed above, however, interlocks that 
raise competitive concerns can arise independently of a merger 
or other reviewable transaction, and the general competition 
laws might not arise until actual anticompetitive harm has 
occurred. Moreover, without a bright line prohibition, the costs 
of dealing with problematic interlocks is likely to be higher than 
in the United States, where the certainty of the rule generally 
leads to “amicable” resolutions of those concerns. In short, the 
section 8 approach is far preferable to the current framework 
for addressing competitor interlocks in Chile—and indeed, 
appears to be an optimum solution overall. 
CONCLUSION 
Section 8 was intended “to nip in the bud incipient 
violations of the antitrust laws by removing the opportunity or 
temptation to such violations through interlocking 
directorates.”165 The per se test applied by the courts allows for 
the statute to serve its prophylactic purpose, at the same time 
the de minimis exemptions exclude interlocks unlikely to have 
an adverse effect on competition. Although section 8 may be 
over- or under-inclusive in certain circumstances, and does not 
always clearly delineate whether firms are competitors, the US 
experience with management interlocks shows that “real utility” 
can be gained when the legislature, the courts and 
commentators “thoughtfully address” two legal spheres—
corporate law and competition law—”in a unified manner.”166  
A recent study conducted for the FNE on the Chilean 
health care market provides examples of management 
interlocks, both direct (with common directors between 
different private health insurers and private hospitals) and 
indirect (for example, directors of the insurers participate in 
two or more private hospitals, and vice versa), in an important 
                                                                                                                            
164. See Gabrielsen et al., supra note 9, at 855–58. 
165. United States v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 111 F. Supp. 614, 616 (1953). 
166. Waller, supra note 3, at 858. 
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segment of the economy.167 While simply transplanting existing 
competition law approaches across jurisdictions to deal with 
these issues is not always a recommended exercise, in the case of 
management interlocks, the relevant considerations discussed 
above argue point in favor of adopting a US-style approach. That 
model, if implemented in Chile, would certainly require some 
adjustments to deal with certain peculiarities in the market—
such as when an interlock should be considered to involve 
“competitors” in the context of the country’s sprawling 
economic groups. And it should not be expected that such a 
measure would resolve the myriad enforcement issues associated 
with other types of structural ties between actual and potential 
competitors. Nevertheless, a limited ban on competitor 
interlocks—whether by legislation or adopted through case law 
by the TDLC—would be a good start, and a relatively low cost 
one at that. 
                                                                                                                            
167. See generally PUCV, Private Healthcare Markets, supra note 7. 
